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Enacting the Un-Enactable?
The Local State and Britain’s Prevent programme
Paul Thomas
European experiences of 
radicalisation and counter-
radicalisation - critical 
approaches: Sciences Po
25th October 2013
• Britain’s Prevent – a complex ‘hearts and minds’ counter-
terrorism programme
• Until 2011, two separate national state departments 
involved (Home Office/DCLG)
• Direct work with Muslim young people and communities 
through a large number of local authorities
• Also work with young offenders and prisoners
• Enhanced surveillance arrangements around Universities
• Large number of new Police posts and CTUs
• Distinct historical phases and clearly identifiable tensions
Prevent
Prevent – local enactment
• A new phase in British multiculturalism – ‘policed 
multiculturalism’ (Ragazzi, 2012)?
• British multiculturalist policy and practice has significantly 
developed from the ground upwards – understanding 
local experience and enactment is important
• Drawing on my empirical research around enactment of 
both community cohesion (Thomas, 2007;2011) and 
Prevent  (Thomas,2009;2010;2012)in the north of England
• Also on work of colleagues: Lowndes and Thorp(2010); 
Husband and Alam (2011), Iacopini et al (2011) Vermeulen 
and Bovenkerk (2012),Lewis and Craig (2013),O’Toole et al 
(2013) etc.
Available Now!
Prevent: what the evidence suggests
• Prevent has always been seen as highly problematic and largely 
counter-productive by local state policy-makers and practitioners 
implementing it
• Post 2001 multiculturalist policy of community cohesion has much 
more support as an anti-extremism approach but Prevent contradicts 
it
• This highlights that the problem with Britain’s Prevent has not just 
been organisational (i.e. unhelpful overlaps or confused delivery 
structures) but a fundamental, conceptual one – at ground level, both 
the analysis and preferred solution/approach of Prevent have NOT 
been accepted as helpful or achievable.
• Prevent Review of 2011 did NOT solve this conceptual problem, just 
obscure it. Prevent is now more securitised than before.
Community Cohesion?
• A significant policy shift post-2001 riots
• Focus on dangers of ‘parallel lives’ and problem of ‘hot’ (McGhee, 
2006), separatist and mutually antagonistic identifications within an 
increasingly diverse society
• Inherent problematisation here of previous policy phase of ‘political 
multiculturalism’
• Discursive shift and political attacks on multiculturalism suggest a 
lurch back to assimilationism, but ground level evidence (Thomas, 
2011) suggests a ‘re-balancing’ of multiculturalism (Meer and 
Modood, 2009) towards greater concern with commonality
• Key vehicle for this commonality is cross-community work, utilising 
‘contact theory’ and focussing on common issues to de-racialise social 
perceptions
Implementing Prevent on the Ground
• Involving DCLG/Local authorities (with their wider focus on cohesion 
and equalities work) was a deliberate strategy: 
‘There was a deliberate attempt to get the Local Government 
Department to lead this, and to try and do it in a way that is based on the 
locality and not the ethnicity’ (Sir David Omand, APPGHS, 2011:106). 
• However, local authorities (for example in West Yorkshire: Husband 
and Alam, 2011) saw this as immediately problematic in that they saw 
cross-community cohesion work as the most effective response, but 
government insisted that Prevent work should be with Muslims only 
and be organisationally distinct from cohesion
• Prevent rapidly implemented with heavy national government 
pressure (NI 35), but there was initially a parallel cohesion policy 
agenda and comparable funding
Implementing Prevent on the Ground
Conceptual problems of Prevent implementation were clear from the start:
• Prevent title was consistently avoided in practice because of its stigmatising terrorism 
connections, so young people and communities have often been unaware of the true 
purpose/funding of work (e.g. Kirklees call it ‘Pathfinder Project’)
• Very considerable funding for strengthening local Muslim civil society (with some 
inevitable positive outcomes) within essentialised and reified ‘Muslim faith’ 
communities– anti-terrorism funding for mundane community development, with a 
simplistic deployment of ‘radicalisation’ (Kundnani, 2012) and inevitable resentment 
within ‘at risk but risky’ (Heath-Kelly, 2012) Muslim communities
• Very predictable ‘virulent envy’ (Birt, 2009) from other communities not receiving 
funding – replicating antagonisms that drove 2001 northern riots and the on-going 
‘white backlash’, and explicitly contradicting policy recommendations of Cantle (2001) 
and the Commission on Cohesion and Integration (2007) re. future multiculturalist 
policy/funding approaches
• Clear evidence of increasing Police/CTU control, even within actual community-based 
delivery (Knight, 2010)
Implementing Prevent on the Ground
Much local Prevent work has avoided actual political/social 
drivers of radicalisation/terrorism (Thomas, 2009) because of 
lack of policy and practitioner clarity/confidence about 
purpose and content of Prevent:
• Incoming DCLG Minister (2008/9) John Denham identified:
I found in the DCLG, after some very rigorous examinations 
with officials that there was no understood model of how 
Prevent was meant to work.
(O’Toole et al, 2013:57)
Implementing Prevent on the Ground
These conceptual problems were inter-related to organisational
problems:
• It’s virtually the same individuals who are involved in the cohesion bit 
that are predominantly involved in the Prevent.(O’Toole et al, 
2013:61)
• National government pressure to implement Prevent and its local 
multi-agency structures meant neglect of the developing community 
cohesion policy agenda – local structures on this weak or absent in 
comparison in West Yorkshire (Monro et al, 2010)(but national 
funding for cohesion did continue until 2010)
• This local Prevent overshadowing of community cohesion was 
replicated nationally - O’Toole at al (2013:57) quote a senior civil 
servant at the OSCT as acknowledging that, because of the sheer 
power of OSCT, ‘so what happened was Prevent took over Cohesion’.
Prevent’s Crisis Points
• ‘Spooked’ (IRR, 2009) allegations of large-scale surveillance reflected 
both the ‘embedding’ of Police/CTU within mundane community 
education and engagement, and Muslim perceptions of being 
targeted as an entire community
• CLG Select Community saw this as an opportunity to get their 
department/local authorities out of a policy programme that they did 
not support
• Evidence submissions clearly showed Prevent as ‘failed and friendless’ 
(Thomas, 2010) – either too much or too little securitised focus!
• Committee Recommendations apparently called for organisational 
change but were actually making a fundamental, conceptual 
challenge to Prevent per se
2011 Prevent Review – The worst of all worlds?
• Organisational change of DCLG removal from Prevent and reduction 
in ‘Prevent-funded’ local areas from 80/90 to 28  – succeeded in 
taking Prevent off media/political radar
• However, all local autonomy/Muslim community involvement ended 
and now rigid national control of all Prevent activity by OSCT in 
London- further securitisation of state/Muslim relationship
• Meanwhile, community cohesion/Integration (DCLG, 2012) policy has 
been completely dismantled – end to all funding, guidance and 
monitoring on this policy area, whilst same local authority staff 
responsible still have to actually deliver Prevent
• Prevent Review represented triumph of ‘values-based’ (Birt, 2009) 
approach that questions attitudes of Muslims per se – as shown in 
Cameron’s Munich speech
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